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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem statement 
Blasts and Fires Wreck Texas City of 15.000; 300 to 1.200 dead. Thousands Hurt, 
Homeless; Wide Coast Area Rocked, Damage in Millions
1
 
Texas City, Tex., Thursday, 17
th
 April 1947 
 
“[…]A chain of explosions set off by the blowing up of a nitrate-laden ship smote this Gulf 
port yesterday, killing hundreds and injuring thousands. It was the worst American disaster 
in ten years. Much of the boom industrial city of 15,000 population was destroyed or 
damaged. Property loss will run into millions of dollars. Fires followed the blasts. 
Poisonous gas from exploding chemicals was reported to be filtering through the area. 
Estimates of the fatalities ranged from 1,200 down to 450. Two new explosions rocked the 
city at 1 A. M. today, injuring many persons who survived yesterday's disastrous blasts. 
There were no immediate reports of additional deaths […] The explosion was the worst in 
Texas history, exceeding even the New London school explosion in 1937 when in 294 
school children were killed. It was the second worst disaster in Texas history, being 
exceeded only by that of the Galveston hurricane in 1900, when 5,000 to 8,0000 (sic) fled. 
[…]” 
 
In the 17
th
 century, the doctrine of “mare liberum”, introduced by the Dutch jurist 
Hugo Grotius, formed the basis of the classical international law of the sea.
2
 The doctrine 
claimed that all states are free to use the seas to develop trade, which fitted the Dutch 
trading policy at that time.
3
 Soon it became clear that this doctrine did not have an absolute 
character and that new legislation should regulate the various uses of the sea. The example 
                                               
1 Headline New York Times, “Blasts and Fires Wrecht Texas City of 15.000; 300 to 1200 dead; Thousand 
Hurt, Homeless; Wide Coast Area Rocked Damage in Millions”, April 17, 1947. 
2 GROTIUS, H., The freedom of the Seas. (Translation with a revision of the Latin Text of 1633 by Ralph 
Van Deman Magoffin, and edited by James Brown Scott).  
3
 CHURCHILL, R.R., LOWE, A.V., The law of the sea, 1999, p 4.  
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of a disaster mentioned in the newspaper article above shows that there is a need for an 
international regime to all the problems that come with such a major accident.  
After the Second World War, international trade, offshore exploitation and therewith 
the risk to pollute the marine environment increased dramatically. Not only the carriage of 
oil increased but also the carriage of other hazardous and noxious substances expanded 
tremendously during the early 1970s.
4
 Therefore states developed a range of measures to 
prevent such marine pollution accidents.
5
 Together with this, the international community 
thought of establishing also repressive measures, such as liability systems. Namely, the 
potential establishment of an international oil pollution liability regime within the IMO 
framework received much attention.
6
 At the contrary however, the establishment of a civil 
liability regime for pollution by hazardous and noxious substances other than oil caused by 
tankers was not considered to be urgently necessary. Several major chemical spills however 
ignited the idea that a new liability regime should be established in order to cover third 
parties for the severe damage that often results from marine chemical accidents.
7
  
It was not until the mid-1990s that states, operating under the International Maritime 
Organization (hereinafter IMO), managed to adopt an Hazardous and Noxious Substances 
Convention, hereinafter the HNS Convention, regulating the liability for accidents caused 
by hazardous and noxious substances. Since its adoption though, many obstacles 
encountered the ratification of the 1996 HNS. Therefore, the Conference of State Parties 
adopted a Protocol in order to facilitate the entry into force of the Convention.
8
  
Whether this Protocol overcomes the various barriers present for the ratification of 
the Convention is still obscure and needs further research. This thesis will therefore focus 
                                               
4 GUNER-OZBEK, M., The carriage of dangerous goods by sea, 2008, p 241.  
5 Conventions such as SOLAS and MARPOL were established. This will be discussed later in this thesis.  
6 The 1992 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution damage (hereinafter CLC Convention). The CLC 
Convention was adopted in 1969, and entered into force in 1975. The Convention was replaced by a Protocol 
adopted in 1992 and entered into force in 1996. 
7 Major reported chemical spills by tankers: Fire on board the Ocean Liberty [1947], which was carrying 
ammonium nitrate. This resulted in damage to the environment and human health; Loss of 51 cylinders of 
chlorine by the SINBAD [1979]; Fire on board the ship the CASON [1987] resulting in a spill of hazardous 
substances including diphenyl methane di-isocyanate orthocresol, aniline and sodium causing danger for the 
environment and human health; For more recent incidents involving vessel carrying HNS, see Report on 
incidents involving HNS, submitted by the UK, IMO Legal Committee, LEG 85/INF. 2, Annex p 6. 
8 Protocol of 2010 to the International Conventions on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection 
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 1996. 
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on the following research question: “To what extent does the 2010 Protocol to the 1996 
Convention strengthens the existing legal framework concerning the liability of marine 
casualties involving hazardous and noxious substances?”.  
1.2 Scope and structure  
In order to evaluate the 2010 Protocol, the discussion of the HNS Convention and its 
background is essential. The first part of the thesis will briefly touch upon the reasons why 
the international community needed an HNS Convention and will give a succinct overview 
of the drafting history of the Convention. The next chapter contains a thorough study of the 
modus operandi of the Convention in general. This discussion is essential to have a better 
understanding of the functioning and the rationale of the Protocol to the Convention, which 
will be discussed in the final chapter. In this last chapter, the reasons of the need for a new 
Protocol to the 1996 Convention will be put forward. This thesis will analyze the cause of 
the problems of the entry into force of the initial HNS Convention: are these problems due 
to the procedural rules, such as the reporting problem, or more to the substantive rules, 
such as the 2-tier system?
9
 And more importantly: are these problems concerning the 
substantive or procedural rules resolved by the 2010 Protocol to the Convention? The new 
features introduced by the Protocol will additionally be analyzed. The conclusion will 
finally set out the main findings of this research.  
1.3 Legal method 
In order to answer the research question put forward above, there will be a focus on 
the Protocol to the HNS Convention. Naturally, the discussion will not be limited to the 
Protocol only. The HNS Convention in general and other relevant legal documents from 
the IMO will be examined as well. This thesis will shortly touch upon other systems of 
civil liability in other Conventions - such as the CLC Convention - in order to create a 
better understanding of the regime established by the HNS Convention and its Protocol. 
The research will not only focus on what the new Protocol brings about but also on whether 
this Protocol will encourage, or at the contrary, discourage states to ratify the HNS 
                                               
9
 This will be discussed at a later stage in this thesis. 
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Convention. This rather succinct thesis is therefore timely as the research question is very 
topical and not much research is conducted about this new Protocol to the HNS 
Convention. 
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2 Background to the HNS Convention 
2.1 The need for an 1996 HNS  
The example of an HNS accident mentioned in the introduction shows that this kind 
of incidents poses tremendous risks to the environment and human health. Furthermore, it 
is generally accepted that international transport of chemicals is increasing dramatically. 
Additionally, scientific evolution brings about various new chemical substances with 
unknown characteristics.
10
 The prevention of such accidents and the development of a civil 
liability system are therefore critical points where the international community should focus 
on.  
2.1.1 Prevention under pollution Conventions 
The IMO already addressed the prevention of pollution by chemicals in its various 
regulations contained in Conventions. One important example is the 1974 International 
Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (hereinafter SOLAS Convention). The first SOLAS 
Convention was signed in 1914. This Convention states about dangerous goods
11
 that, in 
principle, they cannot be transported if they endanger the lives of the passengers or the 
safety of the ship.
12
 This is a pure preventive measure. The later SOLAS Conventions also 
prohibited the transport of dangerous goods. It was not until the end of the Second World 
War, when maritime trade increased, that the IMO set up a SOLAS Convention dealing 
specifically with the Carriage of Grain and Dangerous Goods.
13
 An IMO Conference 
adopted Recommendation 22 in 1948,
14
 which stressed the importance of international 
uniformity concerning safety precautions. After some revisions of the 1948 Convention, the 
1974 Convention evolved and entered into force in May 1980. This Convention both deals 
with dangerous goods in package form and with bulk cargo. In general, the 1974 
Convention still prohibits transport of dangerous goods, unless it is in accordance with the 
                                               
10 SAHEB-ETTABA, A., “La protection juridique de l‟environment marin dans le cadre du transport 
maritime de substances nocives et potentiellement dangereuses”, Revue Juridique Themis, 2001, p 500. 
11 The definition of “dangerous goods” is not given in this Convention. The task to define dangerous goods 
was left to national law. For further details see Ibid.  
12 GUNER-OZBEK, M., The carriage of dangerous goods by sea, 2008, p 8. 
13 Ibid, p 9.  
14
 Ibid, p 9, see further www.imo.org 
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provisions put forward in SOLAS.
15
 This Convention is therefore one of the most 
important Conventions concerning preventive measures against accidents involving 
dangerous goods. Together with this, the IMO established several guidelines such as the 
IMDG (International Maritime Dangerous Goods) Code, IBC (International Bulk 
Chemical) Code, IGC (International Gas carrier) Code and INF Code (International Code 
for the Safe Carriage of Package Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level 
Radioactive Waste on board Ships). The IMO update s these Codes regularly. Other 
Conventions such as the aforementioned SOLAS Convention and the 1973/1978 
International Convention on Prevention of Maritime Pollution by Ships (hereinafter 
MARPOL73/78) often incorporate provisions of the Codes.
16
  
 Both the MARPOL73/78 Convention, the SOLAS Convention and its 
corresponding Codes have the purpose to avoid accidents and to improve safety by dealing 
for example with the carriage of chemicals in bulk on chemical tankers
17
 and chemicals 
carried in package forms.
18
 These Conventions are of course indispensible in order to avoid 
accidents where HNS are involved. However, these Codes do not establish a liability 
system like other Conferences, as will be mentioned below.  
 
2.1.2  Liability Conventions 
Besides these preventive measures, the international community established a 
repressive regime dealing with civil liability and compensation of oil spills.
19
 This 
Convention is “to ensure that adequate compensation is available to persons who suffer oil 
pollution damage resulting from maritime casualties involving oil-carrying vessels”20. It 
only focuses on oil pollution and not on pollution that is caused by other hazardous and 
                                               
15 Ibid, p 10., according to regulation 2.3 
16 Due to the narrow scope of this thesis, these Conventions and regulations will not be further addressed. 
17 See for example SOLAS chapter 7(carriage of dangerous goods) and 74/78 MARPOL Annex II 
(regulations for the control of pollution by noxious liquid substances in bulk) 
18 See for example SOLAS part A of chapter VII and MARPOL annex III 
19 1969 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969 CLC, replaced by the 1992 Protocol) 
and its Fund Convention 
20
 See preamble 1992 CLC. 
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noxious substances
21
, as some states not considered this to be necessary.
22
 However, a 
decennium after the adoption of the CLC in 1969 impelled by the Torrey Canyon disaster 
in 1967, it became clear that the international community should also consider to adopt a 
civil liability convention concerning maritime transport of chemicals
23
 The unique 
character of chemicals, the lack of information about their possible environmental effects
24
 
together with the difficulties in identifying the supplier of these chemical products resulted 
in the conclusion that an extension of the 1969 CLC regime was not satisfactory enough to 
bridge the gap of a civil liability regime for HNS pollution other than oil
25
. A new 
instrument of liability was thus necessary. Consequently, states put the drafting of a civil 
liability Convention for HNS accidents other that oil high on the agenda in the late 1970s.
26
 
The next part of this thesis will deal with some major topics
27
 that delegations discussed 
during the negotiation process that lead to the adoption of the HNS Convention. Thereafter, 
this thesis will shed some light on the 1996 HNS Convention as it was concluded.  
2.2 The establishment of the 1996 HNS 
Before the 1996 HNS Convention was adopted, a period of serious negotiations in 
order to draft an HNS Convention preceded. During the drafting process, the working 
group addressed firstly the party liability before other issues were discussed. The informal 
working group discussed several possibilities.
28
 The first possibility was to hold only the 
shipowner
29
 strictly liable for paying compensation to persons who suffer damage caused 
by HNS incidents. This was in accordance with the traditional maritime law that channels 
                                               
21 1992 CLC, Art 1.  
22 This mainly due to a lack of scientific, insurance and commercial data available about chemical substances.  
23 IMO LEG XXXII/10, Para 82. 
24 This however was also an argument for some states to refrain from any further efforts towards drafting an 
HNS Convention.  
25 SAHEB-ETTABA, A., “La protection juridique de l‟environment marin dans le cadre du transport 
maritime de substances nocives et potentiellement dangereuses”, Revue Juridique Themis, 2001, p 502. 
26 See for example IMO docs LEG. XXXIII/5 Para. 52.  
27 which are important for the aim of this thesis 
28 See for example IMO docs LEG. XXXIII/5 Para. 65. 
29 And not the operator of the ship because (1) international Conventions created a precedent of shipowner‟s 
liability (2) shipowner‟s identity is more easily to find in public documents of ship registries. This facilitates 
victims to identify shipowners better than ship operators. (3) The shipowner is responsible to insure the 
vessel, not the operator. To claim directly from the shipowner would therefore be more convenient. See also 
IMO LEG 63/14. 
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the liability to the shipowner and not to the shipper.
30
 A second discussed option was to 
hold only the shipper liable. A third possibility was to hold the shipowner and the shipper 
joint and severally liable. Another option was to create a two-tier system that holds the 
shipowner liable in the first place and the shipper for the excess liability. Finally, the 
working group considered another two-tier system that holds the shipper liable in the first 
place and the shipowner for the excess.  
During this first period of negotiations, there was some support for the liability of 
the shipper as the inherent damaging nature of HNS goods or the insufficient packing and 
description of the goods, which lies within the responsibility of the shipper, often cause 
harm.
31
 Later on, the negotiating parties considered the shippers‟ liability in the context of 
“risk-spreading” in order to distribute the liability among many.32 The shippers counter-
argued that the risks involved in operating a vessel carrying HNS could not be put on their 
part.
33
 On the 44
th
 session held in 1979, one decided to focus more on two of the five 
alternatives discussed in the 36
th
 session, among which the first and fourth option 
mentioned in the previous paragraph of this thesis. In the end, states mostly favored the 
fourth option - establishing the two-tier system of strict
34
 liability - as it applies risk-
spreading by imposing primary liability on the shipowner and secondary liability on the 
shipper for the residue of those claims that could not covered by the owner.
35
 This is the 
case when the shipowner is insolvent or when the damage exceeds the liability of the owner 
confined by the global limitation.  
The 1984 International Conference on Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
Connection with the Carriage of Certain Substances by Sea (hereinafter the IMO 
Conference) also considered this two-tier system and a considerable majority favored this 
                                               
30 FAURE, F., Tort and Insurance Law, 2003, p 165. 
31 GUNER-OZBEK, M., The carriage of dangerous goods by sea, 2008, p 246 
32 LEG XXXIV/7, Para 38. 
33 SAHEB-ETTABA, A., “La protection juridique de l‟environment marin dans le cadre du transport 
maritime de substances nocives et potentiellement dangereuses”, Revue Juridique Themis, 2001, p 506. 
34 Most of the state parties agreed on the fact that a strict liability system, which means liability without any 
proof of a culpable conduct, should be set up. The Legal Committee agreed on this issue in its 60th session: 
see IMO LEG 60/3. /3. 
35 BIEVRE, A., “Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and 
Noxious Substances by Sea”, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 1986, p 72. 
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system. However, there was some discussion about the methodology of the term “shipper”. 
The identification of the “shipper” when it comes to HNS goods is not as easy as in the oil 
industry, where often one company drills, transports and distributes the cargo.
36
 In the HNS 
industry, there are usually more parties who have an interest in the goods. Later on, a 
proposal surfaced that comprises that the second tier, funded by a collective levy
37
 from 
cargo-insurers, would compensate the victims when the limits of the first tier shipowner‟s 
liability exceeded.
38
  
Secondly, member states questioned what limitation amount should be adopted for 
both the shippers‟ and owners‟ liability within the framework of the two-tier system.39  
Some countries favored a fixed liability rate for shipowners rather than a rate based on 
vessels tonnage. The second tier will collect levies and will function as a sort of stand-by 
fund.
40
 
Thirdly, there was a discussion about which cargoes the draft HNS Convention 
should cover. The idea among participating states of including only bulk HNS and not 
packaged HNS prevailed
41
 because the sole inclusion of bulk HNS in the Convention‟s 
coverage leads to more convenience in defining the term “shipper” and in enforcing 
compulsory insurance requirements.
42
 However, the majority of the states were in favor of 
a rather wide scope of HNS, which included both bulk and packaged cargo causing all 
kinds of damage.
43
 
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter pointed out that there is a definite need for an HNS Convention. One 
should take into consideration that there is increasing transport over sea. Ships transport not 
only oil across the ocean but also other HNS goods. Having preventive measures is 
indispensible to avoid accidents. Luckily, the international community reacted to this need 
                                               
36 GUNER-OZBEK, M., The carriage of dangerous goods by sea, 2008, p 251. 
37 So no direct liability for the shipowner. See also IMO LEG/65/3/8. 
38 IMO LEG 60/3/4. 
39 IMO LEG/CONF.6/22. 
40 IMO LEG/62/4/2. 
41 Ibid, p 248. 
42 Ibid, p 248. 
43
 Not only catastrophic incidents were included in the liability system. See LEG/62/4/1. 
14 
 
of implementing preventive measures quite rapidly. Parties adopted conventions such as 
SOLAS Convention and MARPOL Convention at an early stage. If, notwithstanding all the 
preventive measures, an accident occurred, a liability system should be applied. However, 
there is no such liability system for HNS Goods other than oil. Victims of HNS accidents 
were left alone. When HNS goods damaged beaches as a result of a casualty and when 
cleanup was impossible, victims should go “to the swimming pool” instead, by means of 
saying. The non-existence of a liability system was not bearable anymore and therefore the 
international community reacted. States started negotiations to set up an HNS Convention. 
This was however not concluded over one night sleep. It took a considerable amount of 
time to conclude a Convention. Firstly, parties negotiated whom should be liable when 
HNS damage occurred. Secondly, they discussed limitation amounts and how the first and 
second tier system should operate. Finally, states decided on the controversial issue of the 
definition of HNS.  
This part of the thesis highlighted some of the many problems with regard to the 
adoption of the HNS draft Convention. Some of these issues will be again discussed in 
Chapter 4, after the next chapter addresses the final adopted HNS Convention. 
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3 The modus operandi of the 1996 HNS  
This chapter will deal in general with the several definitions given in the 1996 HNS 
Convention that delimit the scope of the Convention. More in particular the definition of 
ship, HNS and damage will be further analyzed together with the geographical scope of the 
Convention. However, before this analysis, a short discussion will follow about the 
working mechanism in the CLC Convention, which is often called the mother of the HNS 
Convention.  
3.1 The scope of the 1996 HNS  
The final working mechanism decided upon in the Conventions‟ Conference will be 
discussed in this part of the thesis. This discussion will evidence that the earlier CLC and 
its Fund Convention was a model for the HNS Convention. In order to fully comment on 
the HNS Convention, a succinct overview of the main features of the 1969/1992 CLC will 
be discussed first by means of introduction to the scope of the 1996 HNS Convention.  
3.1.1 The CLC Convention 
The CLC, a Convention that established a civil compensation scheme for oil 
pollution damage resulting from maritime casualties involving oil-carrying vessels, consist 
of a three-tier liability system.
44
 The liability under the first tier is channeled to the 
shipowner who is strictly liable for pollution damage
45
. According to article III (5), the 
claim can only be made against the registered shipowner.
46
 The shipowner is entitled to 
limit his liability in accordance with article III (1). The shipowner will not be entitled to 
limit his liability when the damage resulted from “his personal act or omission, committed 
with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage 
                                               
44 MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ, N., Limitation of Liability in International Maritime Conventions, 2011, p 145. 
45 See 1992 CLC, Article III (I). For exceptions to this rule see Article III (2). 
46 Victims can therefore not claim against (1) the servants or agents of the owner or the members of the crew; 
(b) the pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the crew, performs services for the ship; (c) 
any charterer (incl. bareboat charterer), manager or operator of the ship. (d) any person performing salvage 
operation with the consent of the owner or on the instructions of a competent public authority; (e) any person 
taking preventive measures; (f) all servants or agents of persons mentioned in the subparagraph (c), (d) and 
(e); unless the damage resulted from their personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such 
damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result.” See article III(4) 
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would probably result”.47 In order to assure victims that they will be compensated for the 
suffered damage, registered owners are required to have insurance or another financial 
security.
48
  
The liability under the second tier comes into play when the first tier cannot fully 
compensate the victims. The second tier provides compensation by the International Oil 
pollution Compensation Fund 1992, which collects contributions from companies in Fund 
Convention states that received crude oil and heavy fuel oil after sea transportation.
49
 In 
2005, a third tier was established by the 2003 Protocol to the 1992 Fund Convention after 
the sinking of the Erika and the Prestige. The perception that the limits of the second tier 
were still too low can be seen as a direct cause for the establishment of this Fund 
Convention.
50
 Oil receivers in states that opt to ratify the Protocol will finance the Fund 
Convention.
51
 Many countries ratified the 1992 CLC Convention together with its Fund 
Convention, which gives it therefore an important role in the international community.
52
 
Only 27 states are however party to the 2003 Supplementary Fund.
53
 Because of the 
success of the CLC Convention in general, it is used as an example of other civil liability 
Convention such as the HNS Convention as will be elaborated in this chapter.   
3.1.2 Definition of “HNS” 
The HNS are defined in the Conventions‟ article 1.5. as “substances, materials and 
articles carried on board a ships as cargo”54 denoted in various international instruments 
that were concluded to assure maritime safety and prevent pollution.
55
 The definition 
                                               
47 Article V(2) 
48 1992 CLC, Article VII(1) 
49 1992 Fund Convention, article 10. 
50 MARTINEZ GUTIERREZ, N., Limitation of Liability in International Maritime Conventions, 2011, p 146. 
51 2003 Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund For 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, article 10. 
52 See http://www.itopf.com/spill-compensation/clc-fund-Convention/ last accessed 28/08/2011 
53 Ibid.  
54 1996 HNS, article 5(a). 
55 Appendix I of Annex I, The international Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as 
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto; The International Code for the Construction and Equipment 
of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk, 1983 (IBC Code); The International Maritime Dangerous 
Goods Code (IMDG code); The International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying 
Liquefied Gases in Bulk, 1983 (IGC code); The Code of Safe practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC) code.  
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mentioned in article 1.5 also includes “residues from the previous carriage in bulk […]”.56 
The reference made in article 1.5 to the various international codes facilitates consequently 
that amendments made to these codes will automatically apply to the HNS Convention. 
The definition also includes solids and liquids including oils
57
 or liquefied gases.
58
 HNS 
according to the 1992 Convention only includes package goods if they are listen in the 
IMDG Code.
59
  
The drafters excluded solid bulk materials such as coal and also fishmeal and waste 
from the scope of the Convention. Among the excluded cargo is also that kind of oil that is 
causing pollution damage as defined by the 1969/1992 CLC.
60
 This means for example that 
fire and explosion caused by persistent oil falls under the HNS definition in the 
Convention. On the contrary, the drafters did not include damage caused by bunker oil in 
the Convention‟s scope.61Article 4(3)(b) also excludes damage that is caused by radioactive 
materials mentioned in class 7 IMDG code or appendix B of the Code for Safe Practice of 
Solid Bulk Cargoes.  
 
3.1.3 Definition of “ship” 
Article 1(1) of the HNS Convention gives a very wide definition to which ships the 
Convention applies. It states that a ship includes “any seagoing vessel and seaborne craft, 
of any type whatsoever”. Further in the Convention however, one states that warships and 
other state-used vessels in non-commercial service are excluded from the scope of the 
Convention.
62
 This is not the only International Convention where the scope of the 
Convention excludes state-owned vessels. The author of this thesis is therefore of the 
opinion that the exclusion of warships out of every international maritime Convention 
deserves further academic reflection. It seems however not appropriate to discuss this issue 
                                               
56 1996 HNS, article 5(b), again this article refers to the various codes mentioned supra note 46. 
57 Both persistent and non-persistent. 
58 Such as LPG and LNG. 
59 1996 HNS, article 5 (a) (IV). 
60 1996 HNS, article 4 (3)(a) 
61 SASAMURA, Y., “Development of the HNS Convention”, 13th international symposium on the Transport 
of Dangerous Goods by Sea and Inland Waterways, 1998, p 497. 
62
 1996 HNS, article 4 (4). 
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here as this thesis only concerns the set up and evaluation of a liability system for damages 
that are caused by HNS accidents.  
3.1.4 Geographical scope 
The Conventions‟ geographical scope is complex as the application of the 
Convention depends on the type of damage suffered, the jurisdictional zone in which this 
damage occurs and whether the ship is registered in a contracting state or not.
63
 Only if a 
pollution accident, caused by any ship, occurs in the TS (Territorial Sea) and EEZ 
(Exclusive Economic Zone) of a contracting state, the HNS Convention is applicable. On 
the contrary, the Convention is not applicable if pollution damage takes place in the TS or 
EEZ of a non-contracting state. If damage to property outside the ship occurs in the TS of a 
contracting state, then the Convention is applicable. But if the same happens in the EEZ or 
HS (High Seas) of any state, the Convention is only applicable if a ship of a contracting 
state causes the damage. The same rules are respectively applicable to damage to property 
outside the ship which are pertinent to loss of life on board or outside the ship. The 
Convention always applies to costs and damages of preventive measure, regardlesss of 
wherever they are taken.
64
  
3.1.5 Definition of “damage”  
The Convention defines in its article 1(6) which damage the Convention covers. 
Much debate went on about this important concept of damage.
65
 The HNS Convention„s 
definition for damage is similar to the one that the CLC Convention uses. The definition in 
the former Convention is broader though.
66
 Firstly, the Convention covers “loss of life or 
personal injury on board or outside the ship carrying the HNS”.67 Secondly, the 
Convention„s scope includes loss of or damage to property outside the ship carrying the 
                                               
63 See further 1996 HNS, article 3. 
64 1996 HNS , article 3(d) 
65 WETTERSTEIN, P., “Carriage of hazardous cargoes by sea – The HNS Convention”, Georgia Journal of 
International & Comparative Law”, 1997, p 599. 
66 JACOBSSON, M., “HNS Convention: Prospects for its entry into force”, part II – CMI Yearbook 2009, 
2009, p 418. 
67
 1996 HNS, article 1(6) (a) 
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hazardous and noxious substances caused by those substances.”68 Furthermore, the regime 
covers economic loss resulting from contamination of the environment.
69
 The Convention 
covers costs of preventive measures and reasonable measures of reinstatement of the 
environment as well.
70
 Evidently, one often asks the question what exactly “reasonable 
measures” are and to what extent “economic losses” should be covered. Case law will 
decide on this issue. If the “inseparable damage”71 occurs by a mix of both HNS substances 
and other goods, the HNS Convention will be applicable unless there is proof that a non-
HNS good caused a certain part of the damage.
72
 This, again, shows that the HNS 
Convention‟s definition of “damage” is broader than the one that is used in the CLC 
Convention. As already stated above, the HNS Convention does not cover claims that result 
from pollution damage by persistent oil. The aforementioned CLC Convention covers this 
kind of pollution.  
3.2 First Tier: Liability of the shipowner 
Modeled after the CLC Convention, the HNS Convention‟s liability system consists also of 
two tiers. The first tier will be discussed in chapter 3.2. Firstly, this thesis will give an 
overview of the content of the first tier. More in particular, it will discuss the concept of 
strict liability that rests on the shipowner and the exceptions that go hand in hand with the 
concept. Furthermore, it will highlight the duty of the shipowner to conclude insurance and 
to what extent the shipowner can limit his liability.  
3.2.1 Strict and vicarious liability of the shipowner 
As already mentioned, the first tier of the Convention runs parallel with the CLC 
Convention. Firstly, the shipowner is held strictly liable for damage caused by an HNS 
incident. Strict liability is an old concept that was introduced in English law with the case 
of Rylands vs Fletcher. The court decided in this case on the issue of a reservoir; the 
                                               
68 1996 HNS, article 1(6) (b) 
69 Which occurs for example often in the fishing industry 1996 HNS, article 1 (6) (c)  
70 1996 HNS, article 1(6) (d)  
71 For example in case of fire or explosion on board, when the cause of the damage cannot be proved to be 
solely caused by other substances but HNS.  
72
 1996 HNS, article 1.6. Exception to this rule is nuclear damage, see article 4.3.  
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defendant had contracted the company that built it. The reservoir leaked water into the 
coalmines of the neighbor, who went to court to receive compensation from the defendant. 
The court held the following:    
“We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes 
brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it 
escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie 
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape … It 
seems but reasonable and just that the neighbor, who has brought something on his 
own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is 
confined to his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets on his 
neighbor’s, should be obliged to make good the damage […]73  
 
The concept of strict liability was herewith born and other countries apply it 
frequently, not only in the shipping business but also in daily life.
74
 There are several 
reasons for the introduction of strict liability in the Liability Conventions such as the HNS 
Convention. The first reason is of course to secure the payment to the victims.
75
 Another 
reason is that the shipping industry is in a better position to cover often a considerable 
amount of damages caused by HNS.
76
 The shipping industry has namely the operation in 
hands and knows perfectly to what risks the environment is exposed during HNS transport, 
which cannot be said of the possible victims of HNS damage. The shipping industry is thus 
closer to the insurance market and has the full possibility to purchase insurance. Finally, 
the strict liability regime stimulates shipowners to avoid environmental pollution and to 
operate taking into consideration the principle of due diligence.
77
 For all these reasons, 
strict liability is a secure system that aims to achieve the goal of the HNS Convention: 
                                               
73 Fletcher vs. Rylands, 1866, L.R. Ex. 265,279f. see also ZWEIGERT, K., KöTS, H., Einfürung in die 
Rechtsvergleichung auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts, 1996,  p 673. 
74 For example strict liability for motor vehicles‟ owners.  
75 ZHU, L., Compulsory Insurance for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2007, p 90. 
76 Ibid, p 91. 
77
 Ibid, p 92. 
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“[…] to ensure that prompt and effective compensation is available to persons who suffer 
damage caused by incidents in connection with the carriage by sea of such substances.”78 
Exceptions to the liability of the shipowner can be found in article. 7.2.
79
 Besides 
the fact that the liability is strict, it is also channeled to the registered shipowner.
80
 In other 
words, the shipowner is liable for damage that is caused by persons that are involved in the 
operation of the ship such as the servants, pilots, charterers, managers, salvors, etc…, “ 
[…] unless the damage resulted from their personal act or omission with the intent to cause 
damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result […]”.81 
3.2.2  Exceptions to the liability of the shipowner  
There are some limited exceptions the shipowner may invoke in order to avoid 
liability. When “[…] neither the owner nor its servants or agents knew or ought to 
reasonable known of the hazardous and noxious nature of the substances”, the owner can 
avoid liability when he proves the damage resulted from different forms of war or a “nature 
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character.”82 Secondly, the owner 
can avoid liability when he can prove that “an act or omission was done with the intent to 
cause damage by a third party”83 or that “the negligence or other wrongful act of any 
Government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other 
navigational aids in the exercise of that function” wholly caused the damage.84 According 
to this article, acts of terrorism and piracy are included. When pirates, for instance, capture 
a ship  and release HNS in the sea on purpose, the shipowner cannot be held liable.  
Finally, the owner can be freed from liability if he proves that the there was “a 
failure of the shipper or any other person to furnish information concerning the hazardous 
and noxious nature of the substances shipped”85 and that this failure “caused the damage, 
                                               
78 1996 HNS, Preamble. 
79 Ibid, article 7(1)(2), this is further discussed in chapter 3.2.2 
80 Ibid, article 7 (5). 
81 Ibid, article 7 last paragraph. 
82 Ibid, article 7.2 (a) 
83 Ibid, article 7.2 (b) 
84 Ibid, article 7.2 (c) 
85
 Ibid , article 7.2 (d) 
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wholly or partly, or has led the owner not to obtain [compulsory]
86
 insurance”. This final 
defense, the shippers‟ failure to provide information, caused much debate as the channeling 
of liability is partly jeopardized.
87
 This article should thus be interpreted in a narrow way. It 
is worth noting that the second tier still protects the victim when the shipowner is not held 
liable because of the aforementioned defenses of the shipowner.
88
  
3.2.3 Limitation of liability 
The shipowner and his insurer are liable to a limited extent.
89
 The limitation of 
liability is exercised on the basis of the tonnage of the vessel and not on how many HNS 
the vessel is carrying.
90
 After a long discussion, the Diplomatic Conference decided the 
level of liability of the shipowner as follows:  
 
“(a) 10 million units of account 91for a ship not exceeding 2,000 units of tonnage; 
and  
(b) for a ship with a tonnage in excess thereof, the following amount in addition to 
that mentioned in (a): 
(i) For each unit of tonnage from 2,001 to 50,000units of tonnage, 1,500 units of 
account; 
(ii) For each unit of tonnage in excess of 50,000 units of tonnage, 360 units of 
account;  
Provided however that this aggregate amount shall not in any event exceed 100 
million units of account.” 
 
It is clear from the Convention that one opted for a rather high limit of SDR for small 
vessels. The reason for this is that these kinds of vessels are quite numerous and this 
consequently would lead to many claims against the HNS Fund if the SDR limit would be 
set lower.
92
  
The shipowner will be denied the right to limit his liability when there is proof that 
the damage “resulted from his personal act or omission […] committed with the intent to 
                                               
86 See later, Ibid, article 12. 
87 GUNER-OZBEK, M., The carriage of dangerous goods by sea, 2008, p 251. 
88 Ibid., p 251. This will be further discussed in the next part of this chapter. 
89 1996 HNS, article 9. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Refers to Special Drawing Rights (SDR). The SDR values are calculated every day by the international 
monetary fund (IMF) on the basis of  
92
 GUNER-OZBEK, M.,  The carriage of dangerous goods by sea, 2008, p 268. 
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cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably 
result”93.   
3.2.4 Compulsory insurance  
The Torrey Canyon incident initiated the concept of compulsory insurance into 
shipping law. After the incident namely, the IMO discussed solutions to the problems those 
massive accidents were posing. After a long discussion
94
 of the contras arguments in favor 
of and against such a compulsory insurance
95
, the system was for the first time adopted in 
the 1969 CLC Convention and later on to other Liability Conventions such as Bunkers 
Convention, the Athens Convention & EU Passenger Liability Regulation
96
, the Wreck 
removal Convention
97
 and the present HNS Convention.
98
 There will be similar 
requirements in the International Labor Convention, however it is not yet known in what 
form this will be.
99
  
Modeled after the CLC Convention‟s article 7, the HNS Convention also includes 
in its article 12 a requirement to have insurance or another financial security such as a bank 
guarantee in order to ensure that the Convention covers shipowners‟ liabilities. Most of the 
time, Protection and Indemnity insurance clubs (P&I clubs) provide this insurance. These 
P&I clubs give out blue cards
100
, which functions as a proof of insurance for the state party 
that registers the ship. The state party however should evaluate whether the blue card in 
question forms a basis for giving out a compulsory insurance certificate. States on their turn 
                                               
93 1996 HNS, article 9.2. 
94 ROSAEG, E., “Compulsory maritime insurance”, Yearbook 2010 of the Scandinavian Institute for 
maritime law, available at http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/corrgr/insurance/simply.pdf last accessed 
09/09/2011. 
95 For example the Danish, German and British maritime law associations were not in favor of such a 
compulsory insurance system.  
96 This Convention and Regulation will probably enter into force in 2012. 
97 It is not yet clear when they will enter into force.  
98 Ibid.  
99
 Email- Interview with J. Hare, Senior Vice President and council of Assuranceforenigen SKULD. 14 July 
2011, 10u38. Mr. Hare added however that compulsory insurance regulated in international law has many 
negative consequences for the insurer. He mentioned that the insurers‟ liability is often determined by the 
relevant Convention rather than by the terms of the policy of the insurance contract. It was in his opinion that 
these requirements put forward by Conventions are far in excess than regulations applicable to other modes of 
transport, such as transport by air.  
100 ZHU, L., International Convention on Civil Liability of Bunker Oil Pollution Damage; Liability and 
insurance aspects, 2001, p 7. 
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need to provide these certificates when ships, whether or not flying the flag of a member 
state, call a port of a state that is party to the HNS Convention.
101
 State parties to the 
Convention have namely a duty to ensure that every ship entering or leaving port has a 
valid insurance or other financial security.
102
 Together with the system of compulsory 
insurance, this regulation of compulsory insurance is, as already stated before, established 
“to ensure that prompt and effective compensation is available to persons who suffer 
damage caused by incidents in connection with the carriage by sea of such substances”103, 
which is the main purpose of the Convention.  
3.3 Second Tier: The HNS Fund 
This part of the chapter will discuss the second tier, as established by the HNS 
Convention. This thesis will first explain when this second tier will be operational and will 
thereafter shed some light over the organizational structure. Furthermore, a discussion will 
take place about who will contribute to this second tier and what the amount of the 
contribution is. Additionally, this part will shortly touch upon the reporting requirement, 
time limitation to file claims and the entry into force of the Convention. Finally, this 
chapter will touch upon the EU regulation 44/2001and how it interfered with the HNS 
Convention.  
3.3.1 Structure  
In order to assure adequate compensation for the victims of HNS accidents, a second 
tier was established. The second tier will be in function in the following situations: “ 
(a) Because no liability for the damage arises under chapter II 
(b) Because the owner liable for the damage under chapter II is financially incapable 
of meeting the obligation under this Convention in full and any financial security 
that may be provided under chapter II does not cover or is insufficient to satisfy the 
claims for compensation for damage; an owner being treated as financially 
incapable of meeting thesis obligation and a financial security being treated as 
                                               
101 1996 HNS, article 9.1 and further. 
102 Ibid. 
103
 Ibid, Preamble.  
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insufficient if the person suffering the damage has been unable to obtain full 
satisfaction of the amount of compensation due under chapter II after having taken 
all reasonable steps to pursue the available legal remedies; 
(c) Because the damage exceeds the owner’s liability under the terms of chapter II.”104  
 
The HNS Fund will not be applied though in the case of an “act of war, hostilities, civil 
war or insurrection”105 or when “hazardous and noxious substances which had escaped or 
been discharged from a warship or other ships owned or operated by a state and used, at the 
time of the incident, only on Government non-commercial service” caused the damages.106 
In addition, the victim cannot claim from the HNS Fund when he “cannot prove that there 
is a reasonable probability that the damage resulted from an incident involving one or more 
ships”.107 Naturally, the HNS Fund is not liable when it can be proved that the damage was 
caused with intent or due to negligence of the victim.
108
 The exceptions put forward by 
article 14(3)(a) and (b) and 14(4) are similar as those used in the International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds).  
These are not the only similarities with the IOPC Fund nonetheless. The organizational 
structure of the Fund is based on the IOPC Fund as well and the HNS Fund consists of an 
Assembly and a Secretariat too.
109
 On the one hand, the main function of the Assembly is 
that it approves settlements of claims against the HNS Fund.
110
 At the other hand, the 
secretariat and its director‟s main task is to take all appropriate measures for dealing with 
claims against the HNS Fund.
111
  
3.3.2 The contributions to the Fund. 
For a long time there was a discussion about how many accounts the Fund should 
have and who will pay the contributions to the Fund and its accounts. 
                                               
104 Ibid, article 14 (a) (b) (c).  
105 Ibid, article 14 (3) (a) 
106 Ibid, article 14 (3) (a) 
107Ibid, article 14 (3) (b) 
108 Ibid, article 14 (4) 
109 Ibid, article 24.  
110 Ibid, article 26 (h). For further function see article 26 
111
 Ibid, article 30 (2) (e).  
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The 1996 HNS Convention creates four separate accounts that cover damages 
within the same account. The drafters divided the general account into two sectors, namely 
the solid bulk materials and the other substances.
112
 The other three accounts are the oil, 
LPG and LNG account.
113
 Naturally, the relatively safe sector of LNG lobbied here to have 
a separate account.  
The “receiver” of the cargo pays the annual contributions to the general account. 
The general account includes all HNS as defined in the Convention, except for oil, LNG 
and LPG, which constitute a separate account. The “receiver” is defined in the 
Conventions‟ article 1 (4). This article includes “persons who physically receives the cargo 
at the port of the contacting state.
114
 According to article 1(4) (a), it can be contracted that 
the principal of the agent who physically receives the cargo is held to contribute to the 
Fund
115
. The principle must be nevertheless subject to the jurisdiction of a contracting state. 
Furthermore, the Convention includes also those persons that fulfill the requirements of 
being a “receiver” under national law.116 While the importers of HNS substances normally 
pay the contributions, every person that holds title to LNG cargo that is discharged in a port 
or terminal of a contracting State pays the contributions.
117
 Eventually, the latter regulation 
caused problems in the ratification of the Convention, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
Liability to contribute to the Fund will only exist if the receiver, or  - in the case of 
LNG - those who holds title to the LNG cargo, exceeds the limits put forward in article 19 
(1) of the Convention. Firstly, for persistent oil, those persons exceeding the annual 
receipts level of 150 000 tonnes have to contribute to the Fund.
118
 Secondly, contribution is 
also required for receivers of non-persistent oil exceeding the level of 20 000 tonnes.
119
 
LPG and Bulk solids have both a level of 20000 tonnes.
120
 Those holding title of LNG 
                                               
112 Ibid, article 16 (1) 
113 Ibid, article 16 (2) 
114 Ibid, article  1 (4) (a) 
115 This is to avoid that operators of storage facilities at the port are required to contribute.  
116 1996 HNS, article 1 (4) (b) 
117 Ibid, article 19 (b) 
118 Ibid, article 19 (1) (I) 
119 Ibid, article 19 (2) 
120
 Ibid, article 19 (c) 
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cargo do not have any annual minimum quantity of receipts before contribution is 
required.
121
 The maximum compensation the Fund can give is 250 million SDR, which 
includes the amount paid by the insurer of the shipowner.
122
  
 
3.3.3 Reporting requirement  
Member states have an important procedural requirement when ratifying the 
Convention to “submit to the Secretary-General data on the relevant quantities of 
contributing cargo received or in the case of LNG discharged in that State during the 
preceding calendar year in respect of the general account and each separate account”.123 
This procedural requirement is necessary in order to have the Convention ratified, which 
caused again problems to make the HNS Convention a success. The next chapter will 
address this issue again. 
3.3.4  Time limitation 
The possibility to claim from the Fund has to happen “within three years from the 
date when the person suffering damages knew or ought reasonably to have known of the 
damage”.124 The victim cannot bring any claims though later than 10 years from the date on 
which the accident that triggered the damage occurred, regardless of the fact the damage 
was known or not.
125
 
3.4 Entry into force  
The requirements for the entry into force are mentioned in article 46 of the Convention 
and state that the Convention will enter into force when: “ 
(a) At least 12 states, including four States each with not less than 2 million units of 
gross tonnage, have expressed their consent to be bound by it, and 
                                               
121 Ibid, article 19 (b) 
122 Ibid, article 19. 
123 Ibid, article 43. 
124 Ibid, article 37 (2) 
125
 Ibid, article 37 (4) 
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(b) The Secretary General has received information in accordance with article 43 that 
those persons in such States who would be liable to contribute pursuant to article 
18 paragraph (1) (a) and (c), have received during the preceding calendar year a 
total quantity of at least 40 million tonnes of cargo contributing to the general 
account.“126 
As already states above, this article caused some trouble with the ratification of the HNS 
Convention because the requirements mentioned were not met.  
3.4.1 Domestic Voyages 
The Convention generally applies to all seagoing vessels. States can nevertheless 
make an explicit reservation for ships which do not exceed 200 gross tonnage and which 
carry package HNS during a domestic voyage.
127
 Furthermore, states can agree not to apply 
the Convention when it comes to voyages between ports or other facilities of those 
states.
128
  
3.4.2 EU legislation  
The EU, when implementing the Treaty of Amsterdam
129
, established a new regulation 
to have judgments decided within the EU recognized within the EU Community without 
special proceedings. This regulation is named the Brussels I regulation of 20 December 
2000 or the regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments on civil or commercial matters. It includes all areas of civil and commercial law 
except for cases that deal with bankruptcy, insolvency, social security and legal status and 
capacity of natural persons.
130
 The regulation had a serious impact on other Conventions as 
it states that the jurisdiction and enforcement belong to the exclusive EU competence.
131
 
This contradicts to the regime set forth in most of the Liability Conventions such as the 
HNS Convention. The latter regulates that the competence of jurisdiction lies only with the 
                                               
126 Ibid, article 46 (1), emphasis added.  
127 Ibid, article 5.1. 
128 Ibid, article 5.2. 
129 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, Title IV  
130 Regulation 44/2001, Article 1 (2) (b) 
131 RINGBOM, H., “EU regulation 44/2001 and its implications for the International Maritime Liability 
Conventions”, Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce, 2004, p 2. 
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state party where the pollution damage took place.
132
 Furthermore, article 39 of the 
Convention states that the Court of the state where the shipowner or his guarantor (e.g. a 
P&I Club) has organized a Fund to limit their liability, has exclusive competence. This is of 
course in contradiction with the concept of Community Competence that the EU 
Regulation established. Besides this contradicting matter, the regulation additionally 
excludes from its application those Conventions to which the state parties are member to at 
the time of the adoption of the Regulation (2000).
133
 This caused problems to the 
ratification of the 1996 Convention. In order to solve these issues, the EU Council‟s 
decision in 2002/971/EC advised European member states to make a reservation to the 
provisions that overlap with the Resolution in order to give the latter precedence over the 
HNS Conventions‟ provisions regarding this issue.134 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter 3 discussed the modus operandi of the 1996 HNS Convention. This 
chapter is important in that way that it enables the reader to assess the Convention as it was 
in 1996 and to better understand the need for a protocol. The scope of the 1996 HNS 
Convention is dealt with in this chapter, together with the two tiers established by the 
Convention. Notwithstanding the Convention is modeled after the successful CLC 
Convention, it is unfortunate that the 1996 HNS Convention was rather unsuccessful, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
132 1996 HNS, article 38, 39 and 40. 
133 Regulation 44/2001, Article 71. 
134
 European Council document, 2002/971/EC. 
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4 Protocol to the 1996 HNS 
This chapter 4 of this thesis will discuss firstly the need of a new protocol to the 1996 HNS 
Convention. Is this need due to the problems relating to the procedural or more substantive 
rules? It will secondly touch upon the process of adoption of the HNS Protocol. The new 
features that the drafters of the 2010 HNS introduced are discussed in part 4.3, which is one 
of the important issues in the thesis as it points out the problems the 1996 HNS Convention 
encountered. Also those proposals made in the Diplomatic Conference that were not 
adopted, are shortly discussed. Finally, this thesis will comment on the process of the entry 
into force of the 2010 HNS Convention together with the future perspective the Protocol 
has. 
4.1  The necessity of the 2010 HNS Protocol  
 
Soon after the adoption of the HNS Convention, it became clear that there were some 
problems with the entry into force of the Convention. In the period going from the 1
st
 of 
October 1996 until the 30
th
 of September 1997, the Convention was open for signature. 
Only 8 states signed the Convention: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom.
135
 In 2005, there were only 8 states that also 
ratified the Convention: Angola, Cyprus, Morocco, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Samoa and Tonga.
136
 Only two states have more than 2 million gross tonnage which 
is not sufficient according to the requirements put forward by article 46 (1) of the 1996 
HNS Convention. In order for the Convention to become binding, states need to implement 
the Convention in their national legislation.
137
 The other procedural requirement put 
forward by that same article 46, referring to article 43, is that the states ratifying the 
Convention should “[…] submit to the Secretary-General data on the relevant quantities of 
contributing cargo received or, in the case of LNG, discharged in that Stated during the 
                                               
135 For more information about the signatures see www.hnsconvention.org 
136 Secretariat of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1992, Draft Guide to the Implementation 
of the HNS Convention, June 2005, p 23.  
137 In some states however international treaties are ratified automatically into national law or that the treaty 
should just be published into an officially recognized state publication.  
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preceding calendar year in respect of the general account and each separate account.”138 Of 
the aforementioned eight states that ratified the Convention, none deposited data that are 
referred to in article 23 of the HNS Convention.
139
 It is here concluded that the 
aforementioned procedural requirements were a burden for the entry into force of the 
Convention. There was thus a necessity to have a tool to give rebirth to the HNS 
Convention and to solve the controversies that came with it. 
 
4.2  The adoption of the HNS Protocol  
Many organizations and institutions carried on encouragements to ratify the 
Convention. The Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (hereinafter IOPC) Assembly asked 
the EU to encourage their states to ratify the Convention. The IOPC stated namely that 
the “Secretary General of IMO might take advantage of his regular contacts with high-
level European Union officials to draw attention to the problem and to encourage the 
European Commission to put pressure, to the extent possible, on states that have ratified 
the Convention to submit the required reports […].” Additionally it was stated that there 
is a “need for EU member States to show leadership in this regard and […] that he would 
make every effort to assist in this endeavor”.140 The EU took already action in its 
decision 2002/971/EC saying that all states should take steps in order to ratify the HNS 
Convention.
141
 This decision was taken in the light of the jurisdictional problems put 
forward earlier in this thesis. The EC stressed therefore its following ideas:  
“(6) The substantive rules of the system established by the HNS Convention fall under 
the national competence of Member States and only the provisions of jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of the judgments are matters covered by exclusive 
Community competence. Given the subject matters and the aim of the HNS 
Convention, acceptance of the provisions of that Convention which come under 
                                               
138 1996 HNS, article 43.  
139 IMO document LEG/90/9, Agenda item I, paragraph 396, p 49. 
140 Statement by Mr Dimas, Ibid, Para 3.8, p 3 
141 EU decision 2002/971/EC., decision authorizing the Member States, in the interest of the Community, to 
ratify or accede to the HNS.  
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Community competence cannot be dissociated from the provisions which come under 
the competence of the Member States.  
(7) The Council should therefore authorize the Member States to ratify or accede to 
the HNS Convention in the interest of the Community, under the conditions set out in 
this Decision.
142” 
As a considerable amount of states that have a gross tonnage of at least 2 million units 
are located within the EU, the support of the EU for the Convention was indispensible. 
With stating the aforementioned, the EU wanted to avoid misinterpretation and set clear its 
support for the Convention.   
The IOPC‟ Fund and its Assembly strived furthermore to promote the implementation, 
not only within the EU, but also globally by establishing a working group (“focus group”) 
on the HNS Convention.
143
 In order to overcome the procedural problem of reporting data 
on quantities of contributing cargo, the 1992 Assembly of the IOPC agreed with the 
working group‟s idea to set up a Contributing Cargo Calculator (hereinafter CCC).144 This 
CCC is seen as a useful tool and the states concerned supported it.
145
 The Working Group 
further addressed problems relating to the contribution of the titleholders of LNG and the 
reporting of receipts of packaged HNS goods.
146
 There was considerable support in the 
Focus Group to develop a new Protocol out of the discussion concerning these obstacles of 
the entry into force of the HNS Convention.
147
 There was no going back to the 1996 
version of the HNS when in June 2008 the 1992 Fund Administrative Council, on behalf of 
the Assembly, endorsed the draft Protocol made by the Focus Group.
148
 Following on this, 
the administrative Council submitted the draft Protocol to the Secretary General of the IMO 
in order to have it referred to the Legal Committee of the IMO, which will on its turn 
                                               
142 Ibid, Para (6) and (7). 
143 JACOBSSON, M., The HNS Convention – Prospects for its entry into force, Yearbook of the Committee 
Maritime International (CMI), 2009, p 417. See 92 FUND/A.12/28 Para 27.16, p 22 for the establishment of 
the “Focus Group” in its October session in 2007. 
144 1992 IOPC Fund Documents 92FUND/A.10/37, Para. 15.6-15.13 and  SUPPFUND/A/ES.1/21, Para 9.2-
9.10. and 71FUND/AC.17/20, Para 11.5-11.12 
145 1992 IOPC Fund Documents A.10/37, Para 32.4, p 28. 
146 92 FUND/WGR.5/2 Para 1.3, p 3  
147 Ibid, p 3 
148 JACOBSSON, M., The HNS Convention – Prospects for its entry into force, Yearbook of the Committee 
Maritime International (CMI), 2009, p 427. 
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organize a Diplomatic Conference to have the Protocol signed by States‟ representatives.149 
The Diplomatic Conference adopted in 2010 the new Protocol to the HNS Convention: the 
International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with 
the Carriage of hazardous and noxious substances by sea (hereinafter the 2010 HNS 
Convention) was herewith born.  
4.3  New features of the 2010 HNS Protocol 
In order to solve the problems, mainly related to procedural rules of the 1996 HNS 
Convention, the Protocol introduced some new features. This part will discuss these new 
features and the ratio behind them. Attention will also be given to some of the major 
discussions conducted within the Fund Working group, Legal Committee and/or 
Diplomatic Conference.  
 
4.3.1 Contributions to the HNS Fund by package receivers 
The Legal Committee of the IMO, which reviewed the draft of the Focus Group, found 
that one of the major problems of the initial 1996 HNS Convention was the fact that 
package HNS goods were difficult to report for the member states.
150
 However, reporting 
has been found necessary in order to maintain the two-tier liability system as put forward 
by the HNS Convention. States proved that there would be a considerable administrative 
burden for tracking the small amount of HNS that comes in the form of several 
containers.
151
 The Focus Group came up with the proposal that package receivers should 
not contribute to the Fund. In the light of the purpose of the HNS Convention, it was 
important though to secure that victims damaged by HNS accidents can still claim 
compensation for their loss suffered. In order to resolve the problem, the Focus Group had 
to find a counterbalance for the deletion of the contribution obligation. It found the 
counterbalance in increasing the shipowners‟ limitation of liability for claims related to 
                                               
149 IMO LEG/94/4, Annex.  
150 IMO LEG/94/12, Para 4.10, p 7. 
151 SHAW, R., “IMO diplomatic Conference Adopts HNS Protocol on 30 April 2010”, Il Diritto marittimo 
2010, p 295. 
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damages that are caused by package HNS goods. On the Diplomatic Conference, the 
parties present decided on the new limit of the shipowner‟s limitation in relation to ships 
carrying packaged HNS goods:  
 
“Where the damage has been caused by packaged HNS, or where the damage has been 
caused by both bulk HNS and packaged HNS, or where it is not possible to determine 
whether the damage originating from that ship has been caused by bulk HNS or by 
packaged HNS: 
(i) 11.5 million units of account for a ship not exceeding 2,000 units of tonnage; 
and  
(ii) for a ship with a tonnage in excess thereof, the following amount in addition to 
that mentioned in (i): for each unit of tonnage from 2,001 to 50,000 units of 
tonnage, 1,725 units of account; for each unit of tonnage in excess of 50,000 
units of tonnage, 414 units of account;  
Provided, however, that this aggregate amount shall not in any event exceed 115 million 
units of account.
152” 
 
It is clear from this new article that the shipowners‟ limitation of liability for damage 
that is caused wholly or partially by packaged HNS is increased with 15 % compared with 
the level put forward in the article 9 paragraph 1 of the original HNS Convention. This was 
decided contrary to the data that the International Group of P&I Clubs provided concerning 
compensation claims. This Group of P&I Clubs showed that the initial shipowner‟s 
limitation amount could cover the majority of victims‟ claims.153 The Clubs, together with 
some other supportive states, proposed therefore to keep the liability limits as set in the first 
HNS Convention. Other states did not accept this one-sided proposal at the Diplomatic 
Conference, as shown in the aforementioned Protocol article. The final text is found to be a 
                                               
152 2010 Protocol to the 1996 HNS Convention, article 7.2.  
153
 Focus Group Document 92 FUND/WBR 5/5  
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good solution to eliminate the heavy burden of reporting HNS package goods while 
maintaining the main focus on adequate compensation for victims of HNS accidents.
154
 
 
4.3.2 Contributions to the LNG account 
LNG is the last decade increasingly transported by sea. Pipelines transporting gas 
belong more and more to history as trading of LNG happens on a global stage where 
shipping plays an important role.
155
 The shipping industry takes over this business little by 
little by using tankers to trade the LNG. The situation of LNG transport compared to the 
one of 1996 has changed tremendously due to this evolution. When drafting the 1996 HNS 
Convention, governments and major energy companies dominated the LNG transporting 
business.
156
 The gas industry itself suggested that it would be the easiest if contributions 
were done by “any person who in the preceding calendar year, or such other year as the 
Assembly may decide, held title to an LNG cargo discharged in a port or terminal of that 
state.”157 One Decennium later, this did not seem to be a suggestion that would keeps up 
with the increasing LNG transport by sea. The informal correspondence group that the 
IOPC Funds meeting established found a solution for this issue
158
 by adopting a new article 
11 of the Protocol, which states that:  
“(a) In the case of the LNG account, subject to article 16, paragraph 5, annual 
contributions to the LNG account shall be made in respect of each State Party by any 
person who in the preceding calendar year, or such other year as the Assembly may 
decide, was the receiver in that State of any quantity of LNG
159
. 
This article shifts the obligation to contribute to the Fund from the “title holder” of the 
LNG cargo to the receiver to overcome the aforementioned problems. Nevertheless, the 
                                               
154 IMO LEG/94/12, Para 4.12, p 7. 
155 Research by the International Group of Liquefied and Natural Gas Importers, “Implementation of the HNS 
Convention in the LNG Industry”, 2007, p 3. available at http://www.hnsConvention.org. 
156 SHAW, R., “IMO diplomatic Conference Adopts HNS Protocol on 30 April 2010”, Il Diritto marittimo 
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157 1996 HNS Convention, article 19 (1) (b). 
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Protocol still leaves open the possibility that the title holder contributes to LNG Fund. The 
Protocol in this regard states the following: 
(b) However, any contributions shall be made by the person who, immediately prior to 
its discharge, held title to an LNG cargo discharged in a port or terminal of that State 
(the titleholder) where: 
(i) the titleholder has entered into an agreement with the 
receiver that the titleholder shall make such contributions; 
and 
(ii) the receiver has informed the State Party that such an 
agreement exists“160 
The Diplomatic Conference furthermore wanted to make sure that parties could not hide 
behind their contractual obligations in order to avoid compensation to the LNG Fund. This 
is reflected in the last two paragraphs of the new article 11 to the HNS Protocol:  
 
“(c) If the titleholder referred to in subparagraph (b) above does not make the 
contributions or any part thereof; the receiver shall make the remaining 
contributions. The Assembly shall determine in the internal regulations the 
circumstances under which the titleholder shall be considered as not having made 
the contributions and the arrangements in accordance with which the receiver shall 
make any remaining contributions.  
(d) Nothing in this paragraph shall prejudice any rights of recourse or 
reimbursement of the receiver that may arise between the receiver and the 
titleholder under the applicable law.”161 
This amendment to the Convention was successful in the Diplomatic Conference and 
solved one of the major problems that the 1996 encountered.  
 
                                               
160 2010 Protocol HNS Convention, article 11 (2) (b), emphasis added.  
161
 Ibid, article 11 (2) (c) and (d) 
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4.3.3 Cargo reports submission 
As stated in the previous chapter, the second tier is an indispensible tool to assure 
adequate compensation for victims of HNS accidents. In order to let this second tier 
function, a system of contributing cargo reports has been set up.
162
 In total, only two out of 
thirteen states complied with this requirement and submitted reports on contributing cargo. 
The IOPC Fund encountered the same problem of a few states being reluctant towards 
reporting. To solve this problem, the 2003 IOPC Supplementary Fund Protocol included a 
new article that blocks payment of compensation for oil pollution damage that occurred in 
a state that did not comply with its obligation to report their contributing cargo.
163
 At the 
Diplomatic Conference of the 2010 Protocol to the HNS Convention, the state parties 
agreed to add an additional article, taking similar measures against states not complying 
with the reporting obligation. The new article includes three important measures against 
states being reluctant to report the contributing cargo. When states do not comply with this 
obligation and when: “ 
1. […]  this results in a financial loss for the HNS Fund, that State Party shall 
be liable to compensate the HNS Fund for such loss. The Assembly shall, 
upon recommendation of the Director, decide whether such compensation 
shall be payable by state.”164 
The second measure introduced by the new article in the Protocol aims to set up a 
sanctioning system for states being evasive. The measure reads as followed: “ 
2. No compensation for any incident shall be paid by the HNS Fund for 
damage in the territory, including the territorial sea, of a State Party in 
accordance with article 3(a), the exclusive economic zone or other area of a 
State Party in accordance with article 3 (b), or damage in accordance with 
article 3 (c) in respect of a given incident or for preventive measures, 
wherever taken, in accordance with article 3 (d), until the obligations under 
article 21, paragraphs 2 and 4 have been complied with in respect of that 
                                               
162 1996 HNS, article 43 and 46 (1) (b). 
163 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol, article 15. 
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 2010 HNS Protocol HNS Convention, article 21 bis. 
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State Party for all years prior to the occurrence of an incident for which 
compensation is sought. The Assembly shall determine in the internal 
regulation of the HNS Fund the circumstances under which a State Party 
shall be considered as not having fulfilled these obligations.”165  
According to the same article, compensation will be furthermore denied permanently 
when the state in question does not fulfill its reporting obligation within one year after a 
notification of being reluctant is given to the state failing its obligations.
166
 An important 
exception to this sanctioning system is that there will be still compensation for incidents 
having death or personal injury as a result.
167
 However, the state party can still be held 
liable for financial loss if there is financial loss for the HNS Fund that results from a failure 
to fulfill the reporting obligations.
168
  
 
4.3.4 Other proposals on the Diplomatic Conference 
Delegations proposed some other minor changes at the Diplomatic Conference. One of 
them is the changing of the definition of HNS that is put forward in article 1.5(a)(vii) 1996 
HNS. It was proposed to include the current version of the IMDG Code rather that the old 
one in force when the 1996 Convention was signed. Concretely it was proposed to add the 
IMDG Code “as amended”. However, the Diplomatic Conference did not accept this 
proposal because most states were convinced that the definition of package goods as an 
HNS should not be extended.
169
 Firstly, delegations found that the issue of this definition 
was brought up too late so due to time pressure, they were not able to consult their 
governments about this problem anymore.
170
 Secondly, delegations found that experts 
should be consulted in order to see what the potential effect of this change is on the 
working mechanism of the HNS Convention.
171
 Thirdly, they considered the subject to be 
                                               
165 Ibid, article 21 bis (2). 
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167 Ibid, article 21 (5). 
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169 SHAW, R., “IMO diplomatic Conference Adopts HNS Protocol on 30 April 2010”, Il Diritto marittimo 
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very political as it caused some trouble during the 1996 HNS Conference.
172
 Therefore, the 
majority of the states were convinced to leave this part of the Convention unaltered.
173
  
Another proposal that the Diplomatic Conference did not accept is the “tacit acceptance 
procedure”.174 This procedure, as issued by the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, enables 
that amendments can be made to the Convention through a simplified procedure.
175
 
176
  
4.4  The entry into Force of the 2010 HNS Convention 
The 2010 HNS Protocol shall be “open for signature at the headquarters of the 
Origination from 1 November 2010 to 31 October 2011 and shall thereafter remain open 
for accession.
177
 Within this time period, states can sign with or without reservation and 
outside that period, states can always opt for accession.
178
  
The Protocol shall enter into force after “eighteen months after the date on which the 
following conditions are fulfilled:  
(a) At least twelve states, including four states each with not less than 2 million units of 
gross tonnage, have expressed their consent to be bound by it; and 
(b) The Secretary General has received information in accordance with article 20, 
paragraph 4 and 6 that those persons in such States who would be liable to 
contribute pursuant to article 18, paragraph 1(a) and (c) of the Convention, as 
amended by this Protocol, have received during the preceding calendar year a total 
quantity of at least 40 million tonnes of cargo contributing to the general 
account”179 
                                               
172 Ibid.  
173 International Chamber of Shipping Report of the International Conference on the revision of the HNS 
Convention held at the IMO headquarters in London, 26-30 April 2010. Available at www.marisec.org last 
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174 Ibid. 
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The delegations also discussed the requirements for entry into force at the time of the 
Diplomatic Conference. They proposed that the 40 millions tonnes that are mentioned in 
article would be increased up to 60 or 70 tonnes. Furthermore, the delegations proposed to 
reduce the time for the entry into force from 18 to 12 months. This was however not 
accepted.
180
  
At this very moment only one state - being Denmark - signed the Protocol in order to 
ratify the 2010 Protocol to the Convention. When a state becomes a party to the Protocol, it 
will automatically become a party to the whole Convention, as the Protocol and the 
Convention should be viewed upon as one single instrument. This is stated in article 18 of 
the HNS Convention. Furthermore, article 18 states that article 1 to 44 of the Convention 
and together with its amendments will constitute together the 2010 Convention on Liability 
and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious 
Substances by Sea.  
The Assembly of the IOPC, set up by the 1992 Fund Convention, was furthermore 
requested to conduct some assignments among which the administrative tasks in order to 
set up the HNS Fund in accordance with the 2010 HNS Convention.
181
 Additionally, it will 
give the necessary assistance to set up the 2010 HNS Fund. Finally, the IOPC Assembly 
prepares the first session of the 2010 HNS Fund Assembly.
182
 
4.5  Conclusion and future development 
This chapter discussed the main features of the Protocol to the HNS Convention. As 
concluded from chapter 3, some elements from the 1996 HNS Convention had to be 
eliminated and/or amended to stimulate ratification by states. Mainly, there was ongoing 
discussion about some major procedural issues. Firstly, there was the feeling among states 
that the reporting system of package HNS Goods had to be changed, as this caused an 
immense administrative burden for the little accidents that occurred with packaged HNS 
Goods. As a solution, states came up with the idea of excluding package HNS Goods from 
their duty to contribute to the Second Tier of the HNS Liability system and to put the level 
                                               
180 LEG/CONF.17/CW/RD/2/Rev.1, para 1 (1), 2010.  
181 LEG/CONF.17/11, para 1 (a) (b).  
182
 Ibid, Para 1 (c). See further 2010 HNS Convention, article 43.  
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of limitation of shipowners, set forth in the First Tier of the HNS Liability system, higher. 
The second burden for the success of the HNS Convention was that the titleholder of the 
LNG cargo was the one who was obliged to contribute to the LNG account. Due to the 
emerging LNG industry, states considered it to be more appropriate to hold the LNG 
receiver instead of the titleholder responsible to contribute to the LNG Fund. This is similar 
to the other Funds that the 1996 HNS Convention established. Thirdly, states did not find 
enough incentives to report the contributing cargo. This requirement of submitting reports 
was indispensible to make the Convention work. It was rather clear from the beginning that 
a new system had to be set up to give countries enough incentive to comply with their 
obligation of reporting. Therefore, the 2003 IOPC Supplementary Fund Protocol 
introduced a system that frustrates payment of compensation for pollution damage that was 
caused by HNS other than oil, which occurred in a state which did not comply with its 
obligation to report their contributing cargo. By introducing this system, states feel induced 
to comply with the reporting.   
 It seems that the new Protocol strengthens an international legal framework for the 
liability of marine casualties involving hazardous and noxious substances. It is very likely 
that the Protocol helps to overcome resistance in some shipping countries by changing 
some procedural rules. Denmark already gave an important signal: the country, which 
refused to ratify the 1996 Convention, now signed the 2010 HNS Convention subject to 
ratification. The solutions that are found for the aforementioned problems give again hope 
to a global regulation of liability for maritime pollution caused by HNS other than oil.  
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5 Conclusion  
 
The absolute character of the doctrine of the free uses of the sea as suggested by 
Hugo Grotius is without question not standing anymore. Over the years, the international 
community took many measures in order to restrict those freedoms on the sea. Those 
restrictions go from various safety measures, special cargo handling guidelines to 
preventive measures and the designation of duties of various parties in relation to 
dangerous goods. Together with these restrictions there was a need to assure that when an 
accident did occur victims are compensated adequately and should not be forgotten. 
Obligations to have compulsory insurance, to contribute to diverse Funds and to set up 
whole systems of liability, belong to the obligation that nowadays rest on the shipping 
industry. The freedom to do whatever is beneficial for the shipping industry itself is not 
part of today‟s thinking.  
Shipping plays an important role in the world economy and is considered to be the 
most environmental friendly way to transport a considerable amount of goods over a 
significant distance. Still, if an accident occurs, it can have an enormous environmental 
impact where third parties can be seriously damaged. After the Torrey Canyon incident, the 
regulations concerning marine pollution in general and more in particular third party 
liability for oil pollution damage enhanced. The CLC Convention, which sets up a liability 
regime for oil pollution spills, was a step forward in the “laissez-faire et laissez-passer” 
attitude that the shipping industry had.  
The international community felt increasingly that damage that was caused by HNS 
other than oil was something that had to be addressed in regulations. Accordingly, various 
international safety regimes were established. However, there was still a lack of an 
international liability regime for damage caused by HNS other than oil. This thesis dealt 
with the various aspects of the HNS Convention and the difficulties that states encountered 
to make this Convention internationally accepted.  
There was a focus on the following research question: “To what extent does the 
2010 Protocol to the 1996 HNS Convention strengthens the existing legal framework 
concerning the liability of marine casualties involving hazardous and noxious substances?” 
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Taking into consideration the discussed topics in this thesis, this question can be answered 
now.  
By reviewing the initial 1996 HNS Convention, the international community came 
to the conclusion that there were diverse gaps in the liability system. These gaps are mainly 
of a procedural nature. Adjustment of the initial procedural matters by the 2010 Protocol 
was a prerequisite to make the Convention successful. As showed in the above discussed 
chapters, the 1996 HNS Convention and its contribution system is significantly more 
complicated than the 1969 CLC, where it is modeled after. However, the exclusion of the 
duty for receivers of package HNS Goods to contribute to the HNS Fund as proposed by 
the Protocol, simplified the whole system. Besides this, the Protocol also shifted the 
obligation to contribute to the LNG account from the titleholder to the receiver of the LNG. 
Finally, states worked on a sanctioning system to induce states to comply with their duty to 
report contributing cargo. These major topics were the main burdens why the 1996 HNS 
Convention did not enter into force. The 2010 Protocol, by sweeping away these burdens, 
clearly strengthens the existing legal framework concerning the liability of marine 
casualties involving hazardous and noxious substances other than oil. The international 
community is aware that it will be the last chance to conclude a global regime concerning 
liability and compensation for damage caused by HNS other than oil. A failure to have 
such a global regime would probably stimulate states to set up several regional regimes to 
cover the liability for HNS spills. It is only the question whether such a regime is adequate 
to ensure prompt and effective compensation for victims of HNS accidents.  
This author believes that there is a good possibility that the Convention will finally 
enter into force as most of the pressing problems of the 1996 HNS Convention are 
eliminated by the new Protocol. The signature of Denmark, subject to ratification, gives 
again hope to the rebirth of the HNS Convention.  
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